ABSTRACT We consider the synthesis of discrete finite-alphabet inputs for secure communications in multiple-input-single-output wiretap channels. We aim that the source with the synthesized transmissions can communicate with a legitimate receiver and degrade the performance of a potential eavesdropper. To this end, we formulate an optimization problem to minimize the Euclidean distance between the reference inputs and the synthesized inputs. We devise an iterative algorithm to tackle the non-convex design problem with constant-envelope constraints. Moreover, we extend the proposed methodology to deal with low peak-toaverage-power ratio transmissions. The numerical examples demonstrate that the proposed algorithms can achieve the requirement of secrecy communications efficiently.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless communication technology has developed rapidly because of its open and shared nature. However, the ease of accessibility to the wireless channels makes it extremely vulnerable to be eavesdropped on the communication link. Due to the privacy concerns, the wireless medium security becomes increasingly important (see, e.g., [1] - [7] , and the references therein).
Many efforts have been devoted to design secured wireless systems from a physical layer perspective. In the wiretap channel introduced by Wyner [1] , a well-known result reveals that, when the source-to-eavesdropper channel is a degraded version of the source-to-destination channel, the source can encode and transmit confidential messages to the legitimate receiver. Later, the work of Wyner was extended to a more general non-degraded discrete memoryless broadcast channel [2] and the basic Gaussian channels [3] . However, most existing results rely on the assumption of using a random Gaussian codebook for transmission in a wiretap channel
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(see, e.g., [8] - [11] ). Due to system limitations, transmissions of practical communication systems (e.g., finite-alphabet input) differ from the Gaussian codebook significantly (see, e.g., [12] - [16] ). Moreover, transmissions with Gaussian codebook have large peak-to-average-power ratio (PAPR). Typically, transmissions with large PAPR require that the digital-to-analog converters (DAC) have very high resolution, which will increase the systems cost. In addition, they may also degrade the efficiency of the power amplifier in the transmitter. Therefore, it is of practical interest to design constant-envelope transmissions and synthesize discrete finite-alphabet inputs for secure communications in wiretap channel.
In this paper, we propose a secure communication methodology in multiple-input-single-output (MISO) channels where an eavesdropper might be present. The central idea of the proposed secrecy communications is that, with the proposed methodology, the source can send a confidential message to the legitimate receiver and degrade the performance of the eavesdropper simultaneously. Exploiting the transmission diversity provided by the MISO systems, we aim at synthesizing discrete finite-alphabet inputs for the legitimate receiver and Gaussian noise inputs for the eavesdropper. Different from [8] and [9] , which assume that the prior knowledge of the wireless channels is accessible, we assume that the source has a priori knowledge of the directions of arrival (DOA) associated with the destination and the eavesdropper. Such an assumption is justified if the potential eavesdropper can transmit signals to its peer nodes, and we can estimate the DOA of the eavesdropper by receiving its transmissions (e.g., via the antenna array). We use the Euclidean distance between the reference inputs (i.e., finite-alphabet inputs and Gaussian noise) and the synthesized inputs, which is also called synthesis error, as the design metric. To tackle the non-convex design problem, we devise an iterative method based on majorization minimization. The proposed iterative optimization method can decrease the synthesis error monotonically and make the secrecy communication possible.
Notations: We use bold lowercase and uppercase letters to represent vectors and matrices, respectively. C m×n represents the set of m × n matrices with complex-valued entries. (·) T , (·) * , and (·) H denote the transpose, the conjugate, and the conjugate transpose, respectively. | · | and · represent the absolute value of a scalar and the Euclidean norm of a vector, respectively. I M denotes the M × M identity matrix. tr(X) denotes the trace of the square matrix X. vec(X) indicates the vector formed by column-wise stacking of the matrix X. Finally, Re(·) denotes the real-part of a complexvalued number.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider a MISO wiretap system shown in Fig. 1 . In this system, we denote the source node by S, which has N T transmit antennas. Moreover, we denote the legitimate receiver by D and the eavesdropper by E, respectively. Both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper have a single receive antenna. We assume that the source knows the DOAs of the legitimate receiver and the potential eavesdropper with respect to (w.r.t.) the transmit antenna array, denoted by θ D and θ E , respectively. Such an assumption can be justified in scenarios where the eavesdropper changes the work mode and communicates with its peer nodes. In this situation, the DOA of the eavesdropper can be available by monitoring the possible transmissions of the eavesdropper and processing the corresponding received signals (see, e.g., [16] - [18] and the references therein for similar assumptions).
Let s n (t) denote the emitted waveform of the n th transmitter and s(t) = [s 1 
T denote the collection of the N T transmit waveforms. Assume that the transmissions s 1 (t), . . . , s N T (t) are narrowband, then the received signal at D (denoted by z D (t) ) and the received signal at E (denoted by z E (t)) can be written as 
where S = s 1 , . . . , s N T T ∈ C N T ×L is the transmission matrix, s n ∈ C L×1 denotes the digital samples associated with s n (t) and L is the code length.
To communicate with the legitimate receiver confidentially and degrade the performance of the eavesdropper, we propose to design S such that the synthesized input to the legitimate receiver (i.e., z D ) is (approximately) discrete and finite alphabetic, and the synthesized input to the eavesdropper (i.e., z E ) behaves like Gaussian noise. To this end, we minimize the Euclidean distance between the synthesized inputs and the two reference inputs (i.e., the synthesis error or the matching error), defined as follows:
where y D ∈ C L×1 and y E ∈ C L×1 denote the reference inputs for the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper, respectively.
Then the synthesis error in (4) can be rewritten as:
where || · || F denotes the matrix Frobenius norm. Let y = vec(Y), s = vec(S) and note that vec(A H S) = (I L ⊗ A H )s, we can obtain that
with A = I L ⊗ A H .
III. CONSTANT-ENVELOPE TRANSMISSIONS DESIGN FOR THE SECURE MISO COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS
To allow the radio frequency amplifier of the transmitters to operate at maximum efficiency and avoid unnecessary nonlinear effects, constant-envelope transmissions are of particular interest in practice. To this end, we impose a constant-envelope constraint on the transmissions and formulate the associated optimization problem as follows:
where s i denotes the i th element of s, p s = e t /(N T L), and e t represents the total available energy.
A. ALGORITHM DESIGN
Note that due to the constant-envelope constraint, the optimization problem in (7) is non-convex. To tackle the nonconvex optimization problem in (7), one can exploit the semidefinite relaxation (SDR) and Gaussian randomization (see, e.g., in [19] for a survey on this method). However, the computational complexity of the SDR-based method is very high (with a computational complexity of O((N T L) 6.5 ) when the interior point method is employed). To proceed, we use the idea of majorization-minimization (MM) techniques to tackle the optimization problem in (7) efficiently (we refer to [20] for a tutorial introduction of this technique and [21] and [22] for the application of MM in waveform design). A key step in MM is to replace the objective function in (7) with a simpler surrogate function. Generally, the replacement will make the new optimization problem easier. Moreover, the MM-based algorithm, which iteratively solve the problem in (7), has the descent property (i.e., the objective value during the iterations is monotonically decreasing) and remarkable numerical stabilities.
Next, we devise a surrogate function Q(s; s (k) ) that satisfies the following property (In MM, we say that such a surrogate function is a majorizer of f (s) or f (s) is majorized by Q(s; s (k) ).):
with s (k) denoting the transmissions at the k th iteration. To this end, let M = A H A and we rewrite the objective function of (7) as follows:
Note that M λ max ( M)I N T L , where λ max ( M) is the largest eigenvalue of M. As a result, we have
Then we can obtain that
where
− A H y, and c 1 = c 0 + y H y. It is easy to verify that Q(s; s (k) ) satisfies the property in (8) .
Therefore, the majorized problem at the (k + 1) th iteration can be written as
where we have ignored the irrelevant constants.
It is easy to verify that the solution to (12) is given by 
B. CONVERGENCE ANALYSIS
In this subsection, we prove the convergence of the proposed algorithm. To this purpose, we show that the objective value of s (k) satisfies
where (14a) holds because of (8a) (by substituting s with s (k+1) ), (14b) is due to the optimality of s (k+1) at the (k + 1) th iteration, and (14c) is due to (8b). We can conclude from (14) that the sequence of {f (s (k) )} is non-increasing. Moreover, it is easy to verify that f (s (k) ) is bounded below zero. Therefore, the sequence of {f (s (k) )} is guaranteed to converge to a finite value.
C. COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
Next we analyze the computational complexity of the proposed algorithm. First, we can find that
where we have used the matrix equality that (
Then λ max ( M) can be computed in closed-form:
Hence, the computational complexity of computing λ max ( M) is O(N T ). Second, we note that
= vec(AY). Thus, by making use of the structure information of A, the computational complexity of calculating A H y can be reduced
from O(2N T L 2 ) to O(2N T L). As a result, the computational complexity of the initialization of the proposed algorithm is O(N T + 2N T L).
Regarding the iterative part of the proposed algorithm, the computational complexity is linear w.r.t. the number of iterations and the per-iteration complexity. To analyze the per-iteration complexity, we notice that t (k) can be calculated as follows:
Thus, the computational complexity of calculating t (k) is O(5N T L) and the per-iteration complexity is O(6N T L).
Let N iter stand for the number of iterations until convergence. Then the overall computational complexity of the proposed
, which is significantly lower than the SDR-based method.
D. EXTENSIONS
In this subsection, we consider the extension of the proposed algorithm. First, we consider the extension of the proposed algorithm to deal with energy constraint. Under this situation, the optimization problem can be recast as
The Lagrangian associated with (19) can be written as (20) where α is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the energy constraint. Setting the differentiation of (20) w.r.t. s to zero, we can obtain that the optimal transmissions satisfy
where the optimal Lagrange multiplier α opt can be found via solving the following equation
The computational complexity associated with the energyconstrained problem is mainly due to (21) . Remarkably, we notice that (21) can be rewritten as
meaning that the computational complexity of calculating (21) is O(N 3 T + 2N 2 T + 2N T L). Next we consider the extension of the proposed algorithm to deal with an arbitrary PAPR constraint, where the PAPR of the transmissions is defined by
When the PAPR constraint is included, the associated optimization problem can be formulated as follows:
If ρ = 1, the PAPR constraint becomes a constant-envelope constraint and the optimization problem in (25) is the same as that in (7); If ρ = N T L, the PAPR constraint becomes inactive and the optimization problem in (25) becomes the energyconstrained problem in (19) . For ρ > 1, since the PAPR constraint has a larger feasibility region than the constantenvelope constraint, we can expect that the synthesis error associated with the PAPR constraint will be smaller than that associated with the constant-envelope constraint (see, e.g., the numerical results in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4) . We can employ MM to tackle the PAPR-constrained problems similarly. Specifically, the majorized problem at the (k + 1) th iteration is given by
Fortunately, the optimization problem in (26) can be tackled efficiently via the algorithm proposed in [23, p. 198] (with the computational complexity of O(N T L)). Therefore, the associated overall computational complexity for tackling the PAPR-constrained problems is similar to that for tackling the constant-envelope constrained problem, i.e.,
, whereN iter represents the number of iterations until convergence corresponding to the PAPR-constrained problems.
FIGURE 2.
The objective value of (7) versus the number of iterations.
IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In this section, we provide several numerical examples to demonstrate the performance of the proposed algorithm. The considered MISO system has N T = 4 transmit antennas. The code length is L = 16. The DOAs of the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper are θ D = 30 o and θ E = −60 o , respectively. The reference inputs for the legitimate receiver are assumed to be discrete finite-alphabet inputs (e.g., BPSK and 8PSK). The total available energy is e t = 1. The reference inputs for the eavesdropper are assumed to be Gaussian noise, with zero mean and unity variance. We initialize S with a randomly generated matrix, whose elements have magnitudes of p s and phases uniformly distributed on [0, 2π ). As to the stop criteria of the proposed algorithms, we set ε = 10 −3 . We compute the symbol error rate (SER) by carrying out 10 6 independent Monte Carlo trials. Finally, all the numerical results are performed on an ordinary PC with CPU CoRe i7 2.6GHz and 12 GB memory.
First, we show the convergence of the proposed algorithm. Fig. 2 plots the objective value of (7) versus the number of iterations. As expected, we can observe a monotonically decreasing behavior of the devised algorithms. In addition, the run-time until convergence for the algorithm was 0.081 s, meaning that the proposed algorithm has a fast convergence.
Second, we analyze the SER performance for the synthesized inputs at the legitimate receiver. Fig. 3 shows the SERs of the synthesized inputs versus the signal-to-noiseratio (SNR) under the constant-envelope and PAPR constraints. Herein, the SERs of the reference inputs (including BPSK and 8PSK) are evaluated as benchmarks, and the SNR is defined by
where σ 2 is the average power level of the thermal noise in the legitimate receiver. As expected, we can observe a monotonically decreasing SER with increasing SNR of the synthesized inputs. Moreover, the SER associated with the synthesized BPSK inputs is much smaller than that associated with the synthesized 8PSK inputs. In addition, we can observe from Fig. 3(a) that, for the case of constant-envelope constraint, the SER of the synthesized inputs at the low SNR region (<2dB) is similar to that of reference inputs. When the SNR is larger than 2 dB, the performance of the synthesized inputs deviates from the reference inputs. This is because that, in the high SNR region, the signal distortion at the legitimate receiver is dominated by the synthesis error (i.e., the objective value in (7)) caused by the challenging constant-envelope constraint. If we consider a more relaxed constraint (e.g., a PAPR constraint with ρ = 4 in Fig. 3(b) ), we can observe that the SERs of the synthesized inputs and the reference inputs are almost identical. Next, we analyze how the synthesized jamming signals (approximate Gaussian noise) degrade the performance of the eavesdropper. We assume that the eavesdropper might communicate with its peer node and the received signal from the peer node, denoted by r E , can be written as
where c E denotes the received signal from the peer node, and we ignore the receiver noise in the eavesdropper (thus the following analysis result represents an upper bound of the performance of eavesdropper in the presence of jamming signals). Fig. 4 plots the SER values versus the jamming-to-signalratio (JSR) at the eavesdropper, under the constant-envelope and PAPR constraints, where we consider both BPSK and 8PSK signals as the inputs for the eavesdropper, and we use the SERs of the reference inputs as the benchmarks. In addition, the JSR is defined by
As expected, with increasing JSR, we can observe a monotonically increasing SER with the synthesized inputs, meaning that the synthesized inputs can degrade the performance of the eavesdropper. In addition, for the case of constant-envelope constraint, we can observe from Fig. 4(a) that, the performance of the synthesized inputs is worse than the reference inputs. This is also due to the nonzero synthesis error for the constant-envelope constraint. When a more relaxed constraint is imposed (e.g., a PAPR constraint with ρ = 4 in Fig. 4(b) ), the synthesis error is smaller and we can observe that the SERs of the synthesized inputs is approximately the same as those of the reference inputs.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper considered the design of constant-envelope transmission for secure communications in MISO wiretap channels. An MM-based method was proposed to tackle the nonconvex optimization problems. We proved the convergence of the proposed method. Moreover, we extended the proposed algorithm to design transmissions under the energy constraint and the PAPR constraint, respectively. Results show that the synthesized inputs can be used to communicate with the legitimate receiver secretly and degrade the performance of the eavesdropper simultaneously. 
